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THE DISTRESSED SHIP: 
HER RIGHT OF REFUGE AND THE COASTAL STATE 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps· orie.df the most mutually beneficial customary rules on 
international sea law for seagoing nations is the right of a ship 
to seek refuge in a foreign state's sheltered waters. 
It means effectively that ships can travel the world knowing that 
should the need occur, they wi 11, due to reasons of force 
majeure, be able, not only to seek refuge in sheltered waters, 
but will also have a general right to enter the port of a foreign 
state. The rule is independent of any interstate treaties or 
conflict. The distressed ship becomes in a sense a neutral ship 
and when she seeks refuge, the flag she is flying becomes 
practically irrelevant. 
The coastal state's obligation to al low a dis tressed ship to 
enter i,ts sheltered waters is the corollary to the distressed 
ship's right to enter. The state has, however, a customary right 
to protect itself against pollution or anything which could 
prejudice its security. It is obvious therefore, that a conflict 
situation could develop between a coastal state's "refuge" 
obligations and her right of self protection • 
. 
It is the bbject of this paper to discuss the above situatioh by 
first analysing any relevant definitions, examining in detai 1 the 
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laws and customary practices affecting coastal states and 
distressed ships, and then·, with the example of some past 
incidents, attempt to describe the conflicts and dangers which 
can arise when a ship finds herself in a position where she is 
in dire need of a place of refuge. The position of the salvor 
will also be discussed where appropriate. In salvage law the 
reaching of a· place of refuge by the distressed ship is the 
·salver's ultimate objective. For the coastal state, however, the 
problems are only then just beginning. 
The perils of the seas have always fired the imagination of 
people. In most cases complex decisions regarding a distressed 
ship have to be made under the spotlight of the media and intense 
public opinion. Unfortunately this can, as will be seen later, 




CAUSES OF DISTRESS 
Customary law on distressed ship~ does not diff~rentiate between 
the reasons why a ship becomes distressed. A distressed ship is 
a distressed ship but to get a clear understanding of the meaning 
of a distressed ship it is necessary to analyse the causes which 
result in a. ship having to seek refuge. 
Unseaworthiness: To be seaworthy a vessel "must have that degree 
of fitness which an ordinary, careful and prudent owner would 
require his vessel to have at the commencement of her voyage, 
having regard to all the probable circumstances of it" (McFADDEN 
v BLUE STAR LINE 1905 1 KB; @ 697). "A ship is efficient as an 
instrument of transport if hull, tackle and machinery are in a 
state of good repair, if she is sufficiently provided with fuel 
and ballast and is manned by an efficient crew". (Chorley and 
Giles; Shipping Law; 8th Ed; @ 187). 
A vessel in distress due to unseaworthiness need not therefore\ 
have been capable of encountering any type of weather or sea 
condition at the beginning of her voyage. The degree of 
seaworthiness varies in relation to the contemplated voyage. 
Crossing the Atlantic Ocean would call for stronger equipment 
than sailing across the English Channel. 
In marine insurance the most important of the implied warranties 
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is the warranty of seaworthiness. (Chorley and Giles; op cit 
566). A ship is "seaworthy when she is reasonably fit, in all 
respects, to encounter the ordinary perils of the sea of the 
adventure insured". (F N Hopkins; Ship Masters Business and Law; 
5 ED;@ 351). 
A vessel seeking refuge due to unseaworthiness need not however 
be in a poor physical condition. The duty of the carrier to 
provide a seaworthy ship also involves the duty to provide a safe 
warehouse for the cargo and a duty to properly stow the cargo. 
In the case of KOPITOFF v WILSON (1876; 1 QBD;@ 377), iron 
armour plates which had been loaded badly broke loose in rough 
weather and went through the ship's side. It was held that she 
was not cargoworthy and therefore not seaworthy. Grain and 
timber ships are· a good example of how important stowage is in 
relation to seaworthiness. Regulations have been formulated to 
secure the safety of ships engaged in certain trades which have 
been found to be particularly dangerous. (See SOLAS Convention 
1974). These regulations are called statutory seaworthiness 
regulations, the most common being the rules for carrying grain 
and timber. If these regulations are not adhered to, the vessel 
can be termed unseaworthy. 
The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
of Law relating to Bills of Lading of 1924 makes seaworthiness 
not merely an implied term but now an obligation (Art 111 Rule 
l(a)). Vessels/Owners have "to exercise due diligence to make 
the ship seaworthy, to properly man, equip, and supply the ship, 
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make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other 
parts of the ship fit and safe for cargo reception, carriage and 
preservation. Not only has the carrier himself to be diligent, 
but the same duty rests on his servants and agents (ANGLISS & Co 
v P & OSN Co LTD; 1927; 2 KB; @ 456). 
From the above it is seen that the ship owner has NO excuse to 
his freight paying clients and his insurer should his vessel 
become distressed due to unseaworthiness. The coastal state 
which has to receive such a ship will not, it is submitted, be 
blamed if sympathy towards her is limited and strict controls and 
checks are applied to her stay. The "MV KARIN" was detained in 
the Port of Cape Town by the Department of Transport for not 
complying with her Safety Certificate after she was forced by 
"force majeure" to enter the port. The Department of Transport 
found that she had undoubtedly sailed from her last port in an 
unseaworthy condition. 
Distress caused by innocent circumstances: This kind of distress 
is probably the basis of the on what customary law on distressed 
ships. A vessel which sets out on a voyage, and which has taken 
all reasonable precautions, but becomes distressed and needs a 
place of refuge, is the type of scenario, it is submitted, that 
warrants full coastal state co-operation. 
Examples of "innocent circumstances" are situations such as 
unforseen engine and structural failure, fire or damage caused 
by extraordinary weather and uncharted objects. The essential 
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point in "innocent circumstances" is that NO reasonable action 
or precaution could have prevented the incident. The principle 
of "utmost good faith" (found in Marine Insurance) can be 
compared to "innocent circumstances" as the vessel sets out on 
her voyage in the utmost good faith that she wi 11 reach her 
destination safely. The British Marine Insurance Act of 1906 
states in Sec 1 7 that "a contract of marine insurance is a 
contract based on the utmost good faith, and if the utmost good 
faith be not observed by either party, the contract may be 
avoided by the other party". 
As will be seen at the end of this chapter, distress caused by 
extraordinary weather is the most common cause of "innocent 
distress". The power of the sea and wind can, in areas such as 
the international sea route around the Western Cape, South 
Africa, never be underestimated. Brian Weschan wrote in his book 
"Shipwrecks of the Western Cape" (1984) that "the sea routes from 
Table Bay to Agulhas have always known shipwreck and tragedy. 
Ever since early Portuguese pioneer sailors encountered the 
treacherous storms off the Cape, ships of every size and 
description have yielded to the unpredictability of the sea". 
There is, however, a very thin line between distress caused by 
"innocent circumstances" and distress caused by circumstances 
which should not have put the vessel in danger. In an attempt 
I 
to prevent ships from sailing the oceans in a 
condition, vessels have to have surveys to· their hull and 
dangerous ) 
,,----------------~- •··--··----- .. ---- -~----··· 
equipment at stipulated intervals. Thus they can find themselves 
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detained in ports if expired certificates are discovered. As 
early as 1855 Lloyds Register published rules for iron 
shipbuilding, and now many of the surveys are instituted by IMO 
Conventions. A few examples of these are: 
a. Cargo Ship Safety and Construction Certificate 
(incorporating SOLAS 74/78) 
b. Cargo Ship Safety Equipment Certificate (incorporating the 
SOLAS of 1974/78) 
c. Certification of Classification of Class (issued by 
classification societies) 
d. Certificate of Seaworthiness (Only issued in emergency when 
own classification is unobtainable). 
Although the above·regulations do help in controlling standards, 
they are not foolproof. The greatest problem, it seems, is that 
the surveys are not carried out properly or are carried out under 
dubious circumstances. The OCEANOS, a passenger vessel which 
sank off the South African east coast, had, among other things, 
defects in the remote closing mechanism of her watertight doors, 
but all her safety certificates were in order. When an attempt 
was made t6 tow the stricken KATINA P to a place of refuge off 
the coast of Mocambigue (1993) it was found that although she had 
recently been surveyed by the Maritime Hellenic Association of 
Piraeus,· she was in an "appalling state of disrepair" (Mr G 
Needham, Operations Manager of P~ntow Marine Salvage Company). 
More recently the SAN MARCO, a 224 metre bulk carrier,· sought 
refuge in Cape Town harbour after encountering "bad weather" off 
the Cape Coast. The Argus reported on the 20th November 1993 
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that "The condition of the 1968 vessel is such that questions are 
being asked how a ship in such a rundown state could have been 
issued with a certificate, classing her as being seaworthy". 
(The certificate was also issued by the Maritime Hellenic 
Association of Piraeus.) "The hull and deck plating of the SAN 
MARCO are in an appalling condition, badly rusted and corroded 
and in some places worn very thin. The struts hold'ing the 
plating of the hold are also badly corroded, and it is no 
surprise that the plating broke away in heavy seas. It is 
fortunate that the vessel managed to reach port safely as it· is 
possible that she could have split in two, sailing in her present 
condition". 
Chorely and Giles (op cit 85) states that "an effective way of 
ensuring seaworthiness is to provide in great detail what should 
be done and, after appropriate inspection and survey, to prove 
by internationally acceptable certificates that what is required 
has been done". This theory is no doubt a sound principle but 
as the above examples show, the issuing of certificate can be 
easily abused and valid certificates can never be the sole proof 
that the vessel's distress was caused solely by "innocent 
circumstances". 
Self inflicted distress: It is submitted that the key principle 
for self inflicted distress is that the problem could have been 
reasonably avoided or that the vessel turned a "blind eye" to 
obvious dangers. The coastal state will, as mentioned, have to 
accept these damaged vessels but their legal status can certainly 
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change as "force majeure" immunity ( to be discussed later) cannot 
be reconciled with self inflicted distress. 
Self inflicted distress can be caused by many possibilities of 
which three will be highlighted. 
a. 
b. 
Collis ion: The International Regulations for the 
Preventi~n of Collisions at Sea 1972 (Rule of the road) lay 
down very clear instructions and guidelines to the. 
navigator to prevent collisions. These rules, when 
ignored, can be a direct cause of a collision and hence 
cause a vessel to be in a distressed state. "A collision 
betweeh ships _usually involves what is technically called 
a tort, that is, an unlawful act or omission on the part of 
someone responsible" (Chorely & Giles; op cit 365). In 
1978 two ships, the MARITIME HARMONY and the ANNA BIBOLINI 
collided in fog. The court (1982; 2 Lloyds Rep @ 400) 
found that the collision and hence damage to the vessels, 
• 
was caused as a direct result of the vessels' failure to 
observe the Collision Regulations of 1972, which in Section 
1 of Part B calls for a proper radar watch, and a safe 
speed in fog. 
Economic Considerations: "On long ships, such as very 
large tankers and bulk carriers those responsible for 
loading the ,ship have to take care to avoid straining the 
vessel's·hull, If too much weight is placed amidships the 
vessel will sag". (RM Alderton: Sea Transport - Operation 
and Economics; 3ed; 1984). Excessive speed through a heavy 
sea will obviously add strain to the hull. 
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I£ bent 
severely however the ship may become permanently distorted 
which will be aggravated by the vessel pitching when end on 
to the waves. (RM Alderton; op cit 11). 
In the case of charter party contracts which "are usually 
made a substantial period in advance" (Chorely & Giles; op 
cit 218), the vessel will very likely be at some other port 
or even on the high seas when the contract is signed. An 
ordinary charter party contains a term under which the 
first duty of the shipowner is to send his vessel to the 
port of loading. The terms of the charterparty frequently 
impose this obligation in terms such as "with due dispatch" 
or "with all convenient speed" but they may go further and 
impose a final date by which the vessel must reach her 
port. ( See the GENCON charterparty form) This wi 11 be 
construed as a condition, and if it is not complied with, 
the charterer may repudiate the contract. 
In the case of SMITH v DART (1884; 14 QBD;@ 105) a charter 
party provided for the ship to go to a safe port, to arrive 
there, and to be ready to load by a certain date. Owing to 
the dangers of the sea the ship, though she had· arrived at 
the loading port by the date fixed in the contract, was not 
ready to load. The charterers cancelled the charter party, 
and although the owners contended that the delay was due to 
rough seas, the court held that the charterers were 
entitled to cancel. In exceptional cases the cancelling 
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clause "may be qualified, yet to have this effect, and to 
exclude the rule in SMITH vDART, the qualification must be 
clo~ely related to the cancelling clause" (Chorely & Giles 
opcit219). 
The shipowner, through the Master, is therefore under 
tremendous pressure to meet lucrative charter party 
deadlines and vessels can accordingly be pushed too hard. 
If damage is sustained and a vessel has to seek refuge, the 
coastal state could, it is submitted, claim it to be self 
inflicted distress. 
c. Unlawfu1 Activities: In a very recent incident the MV 
FRONTIER was "driven" into· port on the Island of St Helena 
low on fuel. It was discovered that she was carrying drugs 
and the Island Authorities decided to prosecute the crew. 
In the case (William Merk and B Djakumah v Queen; 1991; 
Court of Appeal; Case No 12; Supreme Court London; 
Unreported) the crew's defence was that the FRONTIER had 
immunity because she was a distressed ship. 
The facts of the case showed however~ that because of the 
drugs on board, she could not refuel at an earlier stage of 
her voyage, and hence had to limp into St Helena. It was 
also discovered that the vessel had originally claimed that 
she had engine trouble to avoid having to explain how the 
ship was in the mid-Atlantic with so little fuel. The 
Court found that the evidence as a whole did not establish. 
12 
distress and used the leading English case on the test of 
distress THE ELEANOR (1809 Edw; @ 135). This case involved 
a ship and cargo condemned for breach of the navigation 
laws. At page 161 Sir William Scott said "it must be an 
urgent distress; it must be something of grave necessity; 
such as is spoken of in our books where a ship is said to 
be driv~~ in by stress of weather. It is not sufficient to 
say it was done to avoid a little bad weather, or in 
consequence of foul winds, the danger must be such as to 
cause apprehension in the mind of an honest firm man ... Then 
again when the party justifies the act upon the plea of 
distress, it must not be a distress which he has created 
himself, by putting on board an insufficient quantity of 
water or of provisions for such a voyage for there the 
distress is only a part of the mechanism of the fraud and 
cannot be set up in excuse of it; and in the next place the 
distress must be proved by the claimant in a clear and 
satisfactor~ manner". The court in the St Helena case 
admitted that had the MV FRONTIER been driven out of 
control on to the shore of St Helena, a different argument 
might have been available. But where a conscious decision 
was taken to enter St Helena with a concealed illegal cargo 
giving a false reason for seeking refuge there can be no 
question of succes~fu~ reliance on the law of distress to 
avoid prosecution. 
Finally, there is also some authority, such as the CARLO. 
ALBERTO case (1852; 11 Sirey I;@ 577) where it was decided 
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that vessels which are forced to seek refuge in the port of 
a state· in which they had intended to make an unlawful 
landing, enjoy no immunity at all from local jurisdiction. 
The Master's dilemma. The status of a ship's Master is aptly put 
by the following quotes. "The Master is responsible to the 
shipowner and -is the~ person answerable in law for the safe 
· and efficient running of the ship as a whole" (RM Alderton, op 
cit 70). "The interests of the owners, the safety of the ship 
and cargo, and the welfare of all on board should, it is hardly 
necessary to say, must be the constant concern of th~ Master". 
(F N Hopkins;op cit 164). "The Master 
responsibility for the saf~ty of the ship". 
Commission on Pilotage; Part I; @ 26-27). 
always retains 
(Royal Canadian 
From the above quotes it can be also clearly seen that the Master 
is not only the person who has to make a decision on what to do 
should his vessel become distressed, but he will als6 have to 
.... 
answer why it became distressed. From the writer's experience, 
and human nature in general, there is always a tendency to 
initially "play down" potentially hazardous situations. Mr 
Godfrey Needham ( Operations Manager of the Salvage Company Pentow 
Marine) said that "in many cases the facts concerning a 
distressed ship have to be coaxed out of the Master". In a 
recent incident, south of Cape Point, the. Master of a supply tug 
PELICAN ISLE, radioed that his vessel had lo_st all power and that 
he needed a tow. He also said that his vessel was "in no danger 




the scene the PELICAN ISLE had drifted to within one mile of the 
rocks. (Details provided by Pentow Marine) 
It is submitted that this reluctance to admit danger is probably 
due to the Master's duty of not incurring any unnecessary expense 
for his owners. There is also a natural practice not to draw 
undesirable attention to himself. These at~itudes can cause 
great harm to the coastal state as the true facts of the 
distressed ship can be concealed or misread. The SAN MARCO 
entered the Port of Cape Town in November 1993 with "what the 
Captain reported was a crack", (Argus November 1993) but, she 
docked with two gaping holes in her bows. 
Statistics of Causes of Shipping Casualties: To conclude this 
section on causes of distress the following is a table for 
casualties to ships greater than 500 gross tonnage that occurred 
in 1983. (RM Alderton; op; 199). The total number of ships in 
this category was about 37,800. 
Total Losses Partial Losses 
Number % % 
Weather Damage 72 35 9 
Strandings 34 26 11 
Collisions 11 5 37 
Contact Damage 7 3 Nil 
Fire & Explosions 66 32 5 
Machinery 1 0 27 
Other Casualties 18 9 11 
TOTAL 209 100 100 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE "DISTRESS SITUATION" IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The Distress Principle 
When a ship is driven to take refuge in a foreign port by stress 
of weather; or is compelled to do so by "force majeure" or any 
other overruling necessity, she is not only allowed access to 
sheltered waters but she is also not subject to the local 
regulations of the port with regard to "incapacity, penalty, 
prohibition, duties or taxes in force at that port". 
(International Law of the Sea, Colombos; 4ed; @ 288). R N 
Hopkins (op cit; 30) defines "force majeure" as "Supreme power" 
or (in appropriate contexts) circumstances beyond ones control. 
This rule was affirmed by Lord Stowell in the ELEANOR case. He 
held "real and irresistibie distress proved by clear and 
satisfactory evidence must be at all times a sufficient passport 
for human beings entitling them to the rights of hospitality in 
a British port". 
The French Court of Cassation also held in the CARLO ALBERTO case 
that a ship in distress "is placed, among civilised nations, 
under the protection of good faith, humanity and generosity". 
In the United States of America, A.S~ Story held in the BRIG 
CONCORD case (1815; 9 Granch; @ 387] "where goods are brought 
by superior force, or by inevitable necessity~ into the United 
States, they are not deemed to be so imported, in the sense of 
the law, as necessarily to attach the right of duties becoming 
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payable". 
The time-hallowed ~xc_~pt_i_on ( to the principle that foreign ships 11 , 
--, - . - - C---=J /I 
have no right to enter internal waters of a state), is that of~ 
1'111 
the s~~ess which has a right to enter internal waters'\\!: 
to seek refuge. (DJ Devine, The Cape's False Bay: a Possible) 
Haven for Shi~s in Distress; 1990/1991; SA Year Book of Int Law; 
Vol 16). Ships in distress (for example, ships fleeing from a 
tempest, or.ships which are severely damaged) possess some degree 
of immunity. For instance, the coastal state cannot profit from 
their distress by imposing harbour duties and similar taxes which 
exceed the cost of services rendered. (A Modern Introduction to 
International Law; Akehurst 5ed;@ 170). In order to be exempt, 
however, from the local regulations, it is required "that the 
'necessity' must be urgent and proceed from such a state of 
things as may be supposed to produce, on the mind of a skilful 
mariner, a well-grounded apprehension of the loss of vessel and 
cargo or of the lives of the crew". (The New York; 1818; 3 Wheat 
@ 59). This principle is similar to that of Sir William Scott 
in the ELEANOR case. 
Putting into a port of refuge, or putting back to the port of 
loading, · for the purpose of effecting necessary repairs always 
constitutes a justifiable deviation so that insurance and other 
contractual rights remain unaffected. ( R N Hopkins; op cit @ 
322). The principle of "force majeure" extends to ships seeking 
refuge in a foreign port for vital repairs or a strict necessity 
of provisioning. (The REBECCA 1929; AJIL; vol 23; @ 860). It 
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was also held that International customary law "declares that the 
local state shall not take advantage of the ship's necessity". 
A vessel could, as far as the owners are concerned, also be 
classified as a distressed vessel, if driven into port by 
mutineers, as the vessels entry was independent of the will or 
intention of the shipowner. (The MARIA; 1799; C Robb; @ 340). 
The Distressed Ship and Maritime Zones 
a. High Seas/EEZ 
Coastal States have no jurisdiction over vessels on the high 
seas. The High Seas Convention of 1958, Art 2, states that the 
high seas are open to all States, and no State may validly 
purport to subject any part of .them to its sovereignty. This 
rule is considered to be customary law, codified in the 
conventions prepared by UNCLOS I (United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea) and UNCLOS III, and is a "corner-stone of 
International Law" (Churchill & Lowe; The Law of the Sea; 2nd Ed 
@ 165). 
The exclusiveness of the flag states jurisdiction is, however, 
not absolute. It allows several exceptions, in which third 
states share legislative or enforcement jurisdiction. (Churchill 
& Lowe; op cit 169). One of these exceptions, which is relevant 
here, is jurisdiction in favoQr of a state "whose coastline is 
threatened with serious pollution from a foreign shipping 
casualty on the high seas". (Churchill & Lowe op cit 173). 
The above principle or right gained rapid recognition after the 
• 
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TORREY CANYON incident of 1967. (Abecassis; 1978; ch 10;@ 194). 
The United Kingdom intentionally destroyed the vessel on the high 
seas as she was a pollution threat to the British coastline. The 
two countries involved, the United Kingdom and France, secured 
the convening of a multilateral conference under the a~spices of 
IMCO to consider the matter. 
The 1969 Brussels "Intervention" Convention responded with a 
codification of the right to "take such measures on the high seas 
as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and 
imminent danger to their coastline or related interests from 
pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by oil, following 
upon a maritime casualty or act related to such casualty which 
may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful 
consequences". ( Art i ( 1) ) . In exercise of such authority, 
states are limited by "a standard of proportionality, balancing 
the interest threatened, the probabi 1 i ty of success, arid the 
interference occasioned by exercise (B Smith; State 
Responsibility and the Marine Environment; 1988;@ 219). In a 
subsequent 1973 protocol to the 69 Convention, substances other 
than oil were approved as pollutants. 
The question now is whether "intervention" is a customary 
principle. Bowett (Self-defence in International Law (1958);@ 
105), suggested the customary justification of self-defence as 
an explanation of the intervention right. Smith reports (op cit 
220) that the 1980 session of the ILC concluded that the "TORREY 
CANYON action was an expression of the doctrine of "necessity" 
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which would excuse unlawful conduct engaged in, to prevent damage 
to the "vital interests" of the state outweighing the damage 
attendant to the breach". 
The Law of the Sea Convention contains no direct provision 
allowing coastal states the right to take action against 
pollution c~s~alties. (Churchill & Lowe; op cit @ 262). A 
general obligation to protect the Marine environment is found in 
Art 196 of LOSC (1982) which states that firstly, "States shall 
take ... all measures consistent with this convention that are 
necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine 
environment from any source, using ... the best practical means 
at their disposal ... " Art 221 (4) says that "coastal states may 
... adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and 
control of marine pollution from foreign vessels ... " 
Churchill & Lowe (op cit 262) suggest that there must have been 
some doubt about "intervention" on the high seas being customary 
law otherwise it would not have been necessary to conclude a 
convention on the subject. The fact is though, that the action 
was, as mentioned, readily accepted by other states and this 
could constitute "an emerging rule of customary international law 
which the Intervention Convention simply crystallised and 
clarified." 
The "High Seas" referred to in the Intervention Convention must 
surely be assumed to include a state's EEZ. Smith (op cit 216) 
groups the two zones when he discusses the Convention in Chapter 
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13 and Churchill & Lowe (op cit 262) point out that if "high 
seas" were taken literally, "this would mean that the coastal 
state could not rely on the powers given by the Convention and 
its protocol to take action in its EEZ". This would mean that 
the coastal state would have greater powers of self protection 
on the high seas than in its EEZ~ which is obviously 
unsatisfactory. 
The Intervention Convention does, it is submitted, dilute a 
distressed vessel's "right of refuge", but it does give a coastal 
state the necessary power to avoid having to bear the brunt of 
a maritime incident that is clearly a major pollution threat. 
b. The Contiguous Zone 
Art 24 of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention provides that the 
coastal state may exercise in a contiguous zone, not greater than 
twelve miles from the baseline of territorial sea, "control 
necessary" to 
~ ( i) Prevent infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration or 
sa~itary regulations within its territory or territorial sea. 
(ii) Punish infringement of the above regulations cornmi tted 
within its territory or territorial sea. 
Fitzmaurice, said "It must follow, and this is the important 
point, that foreign vessels in the contiguous zone are not 
basically subject to the laws of the coastal state, or bound to 
conform to them, as they would be if it were the territnrial sea; 
nor are they, in principle, obliged to submit to the control of 
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the authorities of the coastal state, as they would be in the 
territorial sea. International practice allows, or more 
probably, tolerates that the coastal state should exercise 
certain limited powers of control in the contiguous zone in order 
to enable it to prevent eventual infringement within its 
territory or territorial waters certain of its laws". (The Law 
and Proced6r~ of the International Court of Justice; 1951-54; 
@12) 
The Territorial Seas Convention in Art 24 therefore only gives 
enforcement jurisdiction in the contiguous zone. LOSC (1982) in 
Art 33 follows the 1958 Convention on all the main principles 
except that the breadth of the zone changes to 24 NM. "The zone" 
under LOSC, is also not part of the high seas (as it was under 
the 1958 Convention) but now falls within the EEZ. The 
presumption of freedom of the high seas in the contiguous zone 
will therefore fall away. (Churchill & Lowe; op cit 136) 
In 1970 Canada introduced its Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention 
Act. The Act clearly challenged Art 24 of the 1958 Convention 
by prohibiting waste discharg.e and mandating, extensive 
construction, design, equipment and maintenance regulations 
within a zone extending 100 NM from the Canadian north coast. 
(Section 3(i)). In response to a wave of international criticism 
Canada responded in a Canadian Working Paper on the Preservation 
of the Marine Environment (UN Doc A/AC. 138C. 111/L. 26 [19721) 
by saying "A state may exercise special authority in areas of the 
sea adjacent to its territorial waters where functional controls 
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of a continuing nature are necessary £_or the effective prevention 
of pollution which could cause damage or injury to the land or 
marine environment under its exclusive or sovereign authority". 
Churchill & Lowe (op cit 117) support the view that customary law 
"is wider in the contiguous zone than the conventional regime". 
In the TAIYO MARU case (1974; 395 F Supp 413; 70 AJIL 138 (1976) 
@ 117) it was held that Art 24 of the 1958 Convention was merely 
permissive, not exhaustive, and that contiguous zones, apparently 
including both enforcement and legislative jurisdiction could be 
established for purposes other than those detailed in the 
article. 
Due to the fact that in the contiguous zone a state has greater 
powers than that in the high seas/EEZ, and the fact that state 
practice appears to go beyond the powers laid down, it is 
submitted that a d1stressed vessel could possibly fall under 
state control when she enters its contiguous zone on !he basis 
of compromising state security. State practice has also shown 
that the contiguous zone is used for security purposes (Churchill 
& Lowe; op cit 116), and it could be argued that the Intervention 
Convention of 1969 could also apply in that context. 
c. The Territorial Sea 
The term "territorial waters" is used to indicate that part of 
the sea which extends from a line running parallel to the shore 
to a specified distance therefrom, commonly fixed by the majority 
of maritime states at three miles measured from the low-water 
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mark. (Colombos; op cit 75). Since LOSC 1982, the accepted width 
of the territorial sea has been increased to 12 NM (Art 3) and 
the "twelve-mile limit is now firmly established in international 
law, and it is likely that the practice, if not always the 
legislation, of all states will in the near future be brought 
into line with this limit" (Churchill & Lowe; op cit 67). 
The legal status of the territorial sea is described by O"Connell 
as "Territory which ceased to be regarded as something owned but 
came to be regarded as a spatial area within which the faculties 
of severe ignty could be exercised. Po 1 ice powers could be 
exercised outside this spatial area to the extent international 
law permitted, and hence jurisdiction ceased to be coterminous 
with territory. It now became possible to speak of 
"jurisdiction" over coastal waters without imparting the notion 
of property or territory to justify it". (International Law; 
1965; @ 325). Art 2(i) LOSC states that "The sovereignty of a 
coastal state extends beyond 




land territory and internal 
of sea, described as the 
The above q~otes show that a vessel in a state's territorial sea 
is subject to the full jurisdiction of the state as "that power 
exercised by the state over this belt is in its nature in no way 
different from the power which the state exercises over its 
domain on land". (Observation to Art 1: Hague Con£; Second 
Report; Final Act;@ 239). 
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Smith states (op cit 209) that "The definition of the marginal 
sea as ·a component of state territory yields two basic rules 
governing environmental responsibility. First, harm to the -
territorial sea environment constitutes harm to the exclusive 
interests of the coastal state. It is, therefore, the obligation 
of all states to prevent such harm. Moreover, the coastal state 
possesses undeniable standing to_ bring an international claim for 
any breach of this preventive obligation. The second fundamental 
conclusion is that the coastal state's obligation to prevent 
environmental harm to other states arising out of conduct in the 
territorial sea is generally the same, in terms of the standards 
and consequences of responsibility, as that defined with respect 
to any other region of the state's territory". 
A distressed ship, with her potential for pollution, can, as 
shown, be controlled and guided fully by the coastal state even 
though she has a customary right of re.f_u_g_e. The South African 
Prevention and Combating of Pollution of the Sea by Oi~~ Act 6 of 
1981 states in Sec 3 Part (2) "If, while it is within the 
'prohibited area' (See definition in Part 1 of the Act), a ~p 
or a tanker sustains damage, whether to its hull, equipment or 
machinery, which causes or creates the likelihood of, a discharge 
of oil from such ship or tanker, or having sustained such damage, 
enters the prohibited area in such damaged condition, the Master 
of such ship... shall forthwith by the quickest means of 
communication available report to the principal officer at the 
port in the Republic nearest to where such ship .:. sustained 
damage". Sec 4(1)(c) of the same Act states "If any oil is being 
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discharged or ... is likely to be discharged the Minister may, 
with a view to preventing the pollution of the sea 
require the Master ... to move the ship or tanker ... to a place 
specified by the Minister. 
One right that a foreign vessel has which supercedes the absolute 
Sk>-v-e-r-e-l-g.rity of the coastal state in the territorial sea is the 
right of innocent passage (Churchill & Lowe; op cit 73). 
Coiombos (op cit 113) confirms this by stating "A state'i control 
over foreign merchant vessels is, however, subject to their right 
of innocent passage which was upheld. by several international 
jurists in the past and remains equally valid today". The regime 
of innocent passage defined in LOSC (1982) follows closely the 
provisions of the 1958 Convention. Art 1 7 commences with a 
statement of the affirmative right of innocent passage through 
the territorial sea. Art 18 expands the definition of passage, 
' as compared to 1958 by stating in Part 2 that "passage shall be 
continuous and expeditious. However, passage includes stopping 
and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to 
ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure 
or are rendered necessary for the purpose of rendering assistance 
to persons, ships or aircraft in danger or distress". Art 19(2) 
provides: "Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be 
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal 
state if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the 
following activities (h) any act of wilful and serious 
poiJ~n contrary to the Convention and (1) any other activity 
not having a direct bearing on passage". 
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Art 19 appears to deny the coastal state the legal authority to 
prohibit passage or exercise plenary authority over vessels 
leaking oil unless the discharge is "wilful". It does in fact 
seem difficult to comprehend ~n argument that the preservation 
of aesthetic and recreational amenities, resource productivity, 
general economic welfare, and the well-being of the population 
does not t:onst i tute an interest that would be covered by the 
words "peace, good order or security". 
"The consequences, including harm to marine resources interests, 
can be just as prejudicial if a foreign ship with gross 
negligence, or merely accidentally or inadvertently, causes 
them". (Schneider; World Public Order of the Environment; 1979 
@ pl58). Smith (op cit 200) comments that "the 'mens rea' 
component of the Convention's definition of innocence is 
.consistent with neither the underlying logic nor the current 
state of the customary regime. A vessel's innocence, (ie right 
6£ passage), ought not be denied, absent an act or threat of 
pollution which materially affects, or threatens materially to 
affect, the coastal state's interest". 
"Maritime casualty" is defined in Art II of the 69 Intervention 
Convention as a collision, stranding or other incident of 
navigation or occurrence resulting in actual or threatened 
material damage to a ship or its cargo". The definition could 
easily be used to define a distressed ship which by reasons of 
"force majeure" has to seek a place of refuge. At face value 
therefore, LOSC 1982 gives a state less power over a distressed 
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ship in territorial waters (by reason of her innocent passage) r 
than in the EEZ or the high seas. --· 
Art 19 ( 2) of LOSC 1982 declares that only_p_r_e_j_udLc .. i_~J ~~-----~-- .. ---=-- --....: ==-=~·---
"activities" deny a vessel the right of innocent passage. 
~_:::--_~--
Characteristics such as the cargo on board a ship, her condition, 
construction and design would, it seems,@~be relevant when ___..,_,_--.:.. . 
determining a vessel's innocence. A vessel's condition and the 
cargo she is carrying are naturally important factors when 
considering the seriousness of marine pollution but Art 19(2) of 
LOSC 1982, in effect, denies this. This conclusion is bolstered 
by Art 22(2) of LOSC 1982 which confers a very limited right to 
prescribe sea lanes for the innocent passage of "tankers, 
nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other 
inherently dangerous of noxious substances or materials. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE COASTAL STATE 
Besides the already mentioned customary obligation to provide• 
distressed ships with a place of refuge, the coastal state ·has 
a number of other international and local. obligations 
(particularly pollution), which will now be examined. 
International Obligations 
The basic rule governing the internati6nal responsibility with 
regard to the marine environment commits states to ensure that 
no extra-territorial damage by marine pollution is caused. It 
is contained in Art 194, para 2 of LOSC 1982, which providei that 
"States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that 
activities under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted 
as not to cause damage by pollution to other states and their 
environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or 
activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread 
beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign rights in 
accordance with this Convention." 
In addition to the above, Art 235, para 1 of Section 9 of Part 
XI I, refers directly to states incurring international 
responsibility and liability in this respect by providing that 
"States are responsible for the fulfilment of their international 
obligations concerning the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment. They shall be 1 iable in accordance with 
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international law." 
Art 235, like the provisions of various other conventions 
relating to marine pollution provides for state responsibility 
.for a breach of international environment obligations - ie 
res pons ibi 1 i ty for a wrong_ful act ( B Kwiatkowska; The 200 mi le 
EEZ in the new law of the sea: 1989 @ 187). This general 
principle may also be found in the 1972 London Dumping 
·convention. 
ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility list, as an example 
of international ~rimes, those resulting from "a serious breach 
of an international obligation of essential importance for the 
safeguarding and preservation of the human environment, such as 
those prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the 
seas (1980 !LC Year Book Vol II; Art 19). 
In the TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION (1941; III RIAA @ 1905) the 
Tribunal concluded that "under the principles of ·international 
law ... NO state has the right to use or permit the use of its 
territory in such a manner as to cause injury to the 
territory of another " . . . . The International Court of Justice 
in the CORFU CHANNEL case (1949; !CJ 4; @ 22) endorsed quite a 
general theme when referring to "every state's obligation not to 
allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the 
rights of other states". International decisions, practice and 
opinion now clearly evidence the emergence of an international 
obligation designed to check the potentially intrusive liberty 
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of states with respect to environmental matters (Smith op cit 
7 2) • 
In the early years of this century a ·doctrine of "relative 
sovereignty" began to emerge which challenged the "absolute 
sovereignty" of a state. (Smith op cit 69). In the case EL 
SALVADOR v NICARAGUA.(1917·; 11 AJIL;@ 674) it was held that "the 
function of sovereignty in a state is neither unrestricted nor 
unlimited". Larson and Jenks (Sovereignty Within the L~w; 1965; 
@ 11) wrote "No State is entitled to invoke the plenitude of its 
internal sovereignty ... as the basis for freedom of action, 
unrestrained by law, in the international arena. By the very 
nature of international society, by the mere fact that no state 
is entire in itself, by the interdependence which is as inherent 
in the coexistence of States as it is in the social nature of 
man, every State is bound by the law of nations". It is 
submitted therefore that international law defines the limits of 
states' sovereignty. 
A state, even though she has a strict obligation to the 
international community to safeguard her own and other coasts 
from pollution nevertheless, still has to honour the right of 
innocent passage of vessels, including, the passage rights of a 
distressed vessel. The enforcement power of both the port and 
coastal state is, however, subject to highly detailed safeguards 
set out in order to protect freedom of navigation from abuse by 
such states (Kwiatkowska; op cit 182). Arts 224-227 (LOSC 1982) 
provide guidelines for state action that might affect navigation 
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in the EEZ and Arts 223 and 228-232 (LOSC 1982) give procedural 
protection to foreign states. The most important of these is 
the flag state's right of pre-emption which enables the flag 
state to take over proceedings itself (within 6 months of the 
first institution of proceedings by the port or coastal state), 
except in cases of major damage to the coastal state and repeated 
disregard by the flag state of its obligation to enforce 
effectively the appropriate international rules and standards 
(Art 288). 
Local Obligations with an International Interest 
Generally, according to Smith (op cit 106), academic opinion 
appears similarly uniform in the conclusion that there is no 
obligation to prevent, in customary law, harm to a state's own 
territory. 
There are, however, a number of instances of state practice in 
which an international interest in the preservation of a state's 
territorial environment has been recognized and Nspecific 
preventive obligations accepted. This is illustrated in the 
wording of the London Dumping Convention which requires states 
party to the Convention, to prevent the dumping of specified 
wastes both outside and within territorial waters. The 1954 Oil 
Pollution Convention and the MARPOL Convention of 1973 and 
Protocol of 1978, appear similarly to apply discharge 
restrictions generally to regions including the responsible 
state's own territory. 
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Several recent regional agreements such as the Paris Convention 
and Protocol (1983), Kuwait Convention(l978), Helsinki Convention 
(1971) and the Barcelona Revised Draft Protocol for the 
Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution ( 1976) 
impose restrictions on landbased marine pollution and limit, by 
definition, pollution of the territorial environment (Churchill 
& Lowe; op cit 263). 
Principle 7 of the Stockholm Declaration ( 1972) on the Human 
Environment emphasizes the obligation to prevent harm in terms 
of the whole of the marine environment: "States shall take all 
possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances 
that are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living 
resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere 
with other legitimate uses of the sea". Any suggestion, however, 
that a state's management of its territorial resources were to 
be qualified encountered substantial opposition. (Sahni 1973; 
14 Harv ILJ@ 423). Principle 21, the negotiated conclusion as 
to legal responsibility, was accordingly worded; "States have, 
in accordance with ... international law, the sovereign right to 
exploit their own resources ... and the responsibility to ensure 
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction". It can be seen therefore, that 
there is no .international legal responsibility for injury to 
environmental resources within state territory. 
Art 192 of LOSC (1982) commences the marine pollution provisions 
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with an assertion of the same all-inclusive "obligation to 
protect and preserv~ the marine environment" agreed on in 
Stockholm. Arts 210 and 211 proceed from this general obligation 
by stating that there is a duty to. prevent pollution of the 
"marine environment from dumping and vessels, respectively. 
The basic relationship between a state's territorial independence 
and its environmental obligations is defined in Art 193; "States 
have the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources 
pursuant to their environmental policies and in accordance with 
their duty to protect and preserve the marine environment". 
Smith (op cit 109) comments that the environmental duty 
juxtaposed to sovereign resource independence refers to the 
protection of the entire· 11 marine environment", not just to the 
previntion of extraterritorial harm. 
The Right of the Coastal State not to be Prej~diced 
Root wrote in the North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration (1910; XI 
RIAA; @ 2006) that the freedom of the seas "when it a~proached 
the shore, met with another principle, the principle of 
protection, a new independent basis and reason for the 
modification, near the shore, of the "principle of freedom". The 
sovereign of the land washed by the sea asserted a new right to 
protect his subjects and citizens against attack, against 
invasion, against interference and injury, to protect them 
against attack• threatening their peace, to protect their 
revenues, to protect their health, to protect their industries". 
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Art 19 of LOSC 1982, when discussing innocent passage, mentions 
the problem of prejudice, to a coastal state from the presence 
of foreign ships. Devine (op cit 85) states that "Art 19 in 
effect provides that passage which i~ "prejudicial to the peace, 
good order or security of the coastal state" will not be 
innocent. It is therefore not allowed". 
A French writer (Fauchille; Traite de Droit International Public; 
Sec 242; 1922) said "A State incontestably has the right to take 
all measures designed to guarantee its existence against the 
dangers which menace it". An Arner ican writer (Hyde; 
International Law; 1922; Vol I;@ 106) said similarly "when acts 
of self preservation on the part of a State are strictly acts of 
self defence, they are permitted by the law of nations, and are 
justified on principle, even though they may conflict with the 
normal rights of other states". At page 119 he adds ,;This 
freedom of action is due not merely to the circumstance that the 
continuance of the 1 if e of the State demands extraordinary 
measures, but rather to the fact that its safety is je.9pardized 
by the essentially wrongful conduct of another". 
In the case of the VIRGINIUS (II Moores Digest; @ 895 - 890) the 
Spanish Government arrested the ship on the highseas carrying an 
insurgent army to Cuba in 1870. The USA and United Kingdom 
protested but the Spanish Government justified the act expressly 
on the ground that the right of self-preservation was superior 
to the normal right of freedom of the seas. The British 
Government agreed with this principle in the case of the MARY 
35 
LOWELL (1879) by saying that "much may be excused in acts done 
under the expectation of instant damage in self-defence by a 
nation as well as an individual". (II Moore's Digest; p983). 
In the Fur Seal Arbitration (I Moore's Arbitrations; 1902;@ 892) 
Mr Phelps of the United States asserted the right of a nation to 
enforce its laws beyond the marginal sea, "if they are reasonable 
and necessary for the defence of a national interest or right" 
and stated that in such cases other states would acquiesce, but 
if they did not, the littoral state might enforce such laws at 
it discretion. 
In the more recent case of THE DUIZAR (1966) France asserted a 
right to visit and search on the high seas ships suspected of 
carrying arms to Algeria during the emergency of 1956-62. The 
Ministry of Defence argued that the action was justified by 
France's right of self-defence, but the French action was opposed 
by many states whose ships were affected. The explanation for 
the distinction between the responses to the VIRGINIUS and the 
Algerian incidents probably lies in the development, in the 
intervening period,of rules limiting the use of force generally, 
and notably Art 51 of the UN Charter which arguably limits the 
right of self-defence to cases of armed attack. (Churchi°il & 
Lowe; op cit 174) 
Self-defence or prejudice to the coastal state as giving a reason 
for the coastal state to refuse entry or to expel a ship in the 
exercise of self help could, in theory, be of different kinds 
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(Devine; op cit 90,91). These are in summary: 
a. Prejudice to Security: The ship in distress might pose a 
threat to the security of the coastal state. It might be 
in the vicinity of sensitive and strategic naval 
installations and therefore be in a position to obtain, and 
later to pass on, information which might be prejudicial to 
tne coastal state. Devine qualifies the above point by 
stating that in most cases a state will have an opportunity 
to place the ship in a more acceptable position of refuge 
but, it is submitted, vessels which have suffered 
sufficient damage to claim "distress" status, are normally 
looking for the shortest route to a place of refuge. 
b. Prejudice to Good Order:· The ship in distress might pose 
a threat to the good order of the coastal state in several 
ways such as trafficking in drugs, smuggling or landing 
illegal immigrants. It might even be landing insurgents or 
arms for insurgents. It could pose a health thre§t and in 
all these cases a state would be entitled to take 
reasonable measures to safeguard its interests. Whether a 
state could expel a ship or refuse it entry i~ a way that 
would endanger it, or persons or property on board, would 
not be difficult to justify by way of self help. A state 
would, have to take less extreme measures to protect its 
legitimate interests. 
c. Pollution Prejudice: An example of. pollution prejudice 
would be the following: 
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A ship is leaking oil and needs 
repairs. The weather is such that if she leaves ( or i,s 
refused entry) she may founder and perhaps cause a greater 
oil spill. The prejudice to the ship, to persons or 
property on board, and to the environment in general, which 
results from leaving (or not entering), may far exceed the 
threat posed to the environment of the coastal state from 
the minor leak. If, however, the ship were leaking oil 
substantially, the case for expulsion would be strong but 
not at the expense of the lives of the crew. Each case 
similar to this would have to be weighed on the facts 
available. Self-help'by way of expulsion is only available 
where the coastal state's environmental interest is not 
outweighed by a greater interest. 
It is submitted that any actions taken by a state would have to 
be reasonable so that all the costs could be recovered. Jessup 
(op cit 194) states that international customary law "declares 
that the local State shal 1 not take advantage of the ship's 
necessity". Over..:zealous actions by a State against a distressed 
ship can subject the State to damage claims. In the case of THE 
AUGUSTA (1887; 6 Asp MC; @ 161) an umpire awarded damages to 
American claimants as THE AUGUSTA was forced to take refuge in 
a Mexican port after being placed in great danger caused by 
damage suffered in a storm. The cargo was unloaded to permit 
repairs and permission to reload was denied over a long period 
on the basis of unfounded suspicions of intent to smuggle. 
Another case was that of the British ship YORK (II Moore's digest 
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362) driven ashore and stranded on the North Carolina coast 
through stress of weather. She was destroyed by two United 
States cruisers to prevent her falling into the possession of the 
Confederate forces. The American and British Claims Commission 




PRESERVING SAFETY OF NAVIGATION 
. 
Another aspect of port and state enforcement jurisdiction is the 
question of preserving the safety of navigation. Along with 
fishing, navigation is surely the oldest use of the sea and it 
remains logically one of the most important. While aircraft may 
have replaced ships as the prime means of conveying people across 
the o~eans, ships are still the most important means of 
transporting goods on such routes. 
There is a network of international conventions imposing s~fety 
standards and regulations which has arisen in order to ensure 
that navigation rights are exercised, in an orderly and safe 
manner, and by implication, reduce the number of ships having to 
seek refuge. In recent years there has been a tremendous 
increase in the number of ships which have made the world's 
busiest waterways particularly hazardous. The total world 
tonnage has incieased five fold between 1948 and 1978 (Churchill 
& Lowe; op cit 204). The size of ships has also increased 
enormously with consequent reductions in manoeuvrability and the 
1972 Collision Regulations had to provide extensive new 
regulations on traffic separation schemes (Rule 10). 
Navigation rights and safety obligations imposed by international 
law cannot be enjoyed by or i.mposed on ships as such, since ships 
are not subjects of international law (Churchill & Lowe; op cit 
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205). Ships derive their rights and obligations from the state 
whose flag they fly and whose nationality they bear. Art 5 of 
the High Seas Convention states that "the State must effectively 
exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, 
technical and social matters over ships flying its flag". 
Art 10 of the same convention provides that every state shall 
take such measures for its vessels as are necessary to ensure 
safety at sea with regard to communications, the prevention of 
collisions, crew conditions and the construction, equipment and 
seaworthiness of ships in conformity with "generally accepted 
international standards". It is obviously in the interests of 
shipowners, seafarers and the community at large that the 
transportation of people and goods by ships should be made as 
safe as possible, and that accidents such as foundering, 
stranding or collision should be kept to the minimum. LOSC 
(1982) adopts this same basic approach, but sets out in more 
detail the duties of the ilil state (including for example, the 
duty to maintain regular checks upon the seaworthiness 9f ships) 
to ensure that crews are properly qualified and to hold inquirie~ 
into shipping casualties. (LOSC; Art 94). 
Each state therefore remains free in theory to apply its own 
legal standards to issues relating to seaworthiness but there 
would surely be chaos if these standards varied widely or were 
incompatible. It is also a fact that improved safety measures 
usually involve extra costs for shipowners and most states would 
naturally be reluctant to impose stricter safety legislation on 
-- . -
. -
their shipowners unless other states do the same. 
41 
For these 
reasons, therefore, the international community has developed a 
set of uniform international standards to promote the safety of 
shipping. 
The main convention dealing with seaworthiness of ships is the 
already mentioned International Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea (1974). This Convention contains a large number of 
regulations laying down standards relating to the construction 
of ships, fire-safety measures, 1 if e saving appliances, the 
carriage of navigation equipment and other aspects of the safety 
of navigation. These standards are to be prescribed by 
contracting states for their vessels and enforcement lies largely 
with the flag state but port states have a limited degree of 
control (Churchill & Lowe; op cit 211). 
-------------,,,---
Coastal states are entitled to see that ships of other 
contracting parties in their ports have on board valid 
certificates of the kind required by this Convention. Where 
"there are cljar grounds for believing that the conditfon of the 
ship or of its equipment does not correspond substantially with 
the particulars of any of the. certificates", or where a 
certificate has expired or where the ship and its equipment do 
not comply with the provisions of Regulation 11 of Chapter 1 of 
the 1974 Convention (which requires the condition of a ship and 
its equipment to be maintained after a survey), the authorities 
of .the port state "shall take steps to ensure that the ship shall 
not sail until it can proceed to sea or leave the port for the 
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purpose of proceeding to the appropriate repair yard without 
danger to the ship or persons on board (Cha_pter I; Regulation 
14) • 
As well as the SOLAS Convention, there are three other IMO 
conventions which are concerned with the seaworthiness of ships. 
The International Conventi-0n on Load Lines of 1966 deals with the 
problem of overloading, often the cause of casualties to ships, 
by prescribing the minimum freeboard to which the ship is 
permitted to be loaded. Enforcement of the Convention is very 
similar to that of the SOLAS Convention, including the power of 
the port state to obtain ships which lack an appropriate and 
valid certificate. The 1971 Agreement on Special Trade Passenger 
Ships, together with its Protocol of 1973, deals with the safety 
of ships carrying large numbers of unberthed passengers in 
special trades, such as the pilgrim trade, while the 1977 
International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels (not 
yet in force) lays down regulations governing the construction 
and equipment of fishing vessels. 
As mentioned before, the enforcement of these IMO conventions 
remains a problem. Churchill & Lowe (op cit 217) state "a basic 
defect of these IMO conventions is that, for the most part, 
enforcement lies in the hands of the flag state. Thus, if that 
state is unable or unwilling to enforce these standards - and 
this is allegedly usually to be the case with flags of 
convenience (except perhaps now Liberia), although flags of 
43 
convenience states are not the only flag states culpable in this 
regard - then, however admirable the standards may be in theory, 
they will in practice be ineffecti~e in dealing with the problems 
at which they are aimed". 
The current drawbacks of flag state enforcement are to some 
extent overcome by the powers of control given to the port state 
by some of the IMO conventions. A similar approach is found in 
ILO Convention No. 147 of 1976 concerning Minimum Standards in 
Merchant ships. Under this convention, a state which believes 
that a foreign vessel in one of its ports does not conform to 
certain specified safety standards may inform the flag state and 
"may take measures mecessary to rectify any conditions on board 
which are clearly hazardous to safety or health", provided that 
it does not·"unnecessarily detain or delay the ship". (Art 4). 
It would seem that under customary international law, port states 
have, and in practice exercise, the competence to inspect foreign 
vessels in their ports and detain them if unsafe, so that the ILO 
and IMO Conventions essentially do no more than consolidate and 
clarify existing law and encourage port states to use their 
powers. Consolidating this line of thinking even further, but 
still in accordance with customary international law, the 
maritime authorities of fourteen West European states signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control on 26 January 
19 82. Under this memorandum, each authority undertakes to 
maintain an effective system of port state control to ensure that 
. vessels visiting its ports comply with the main IMO safety 
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conventions discussed above, ILO Convention No. 147 as modified 
by the 1978 Protocol, to the extent that such conventions are in 
force .and the port state is party - but regardless of whether the 
flag state of the ship concerned is a party. Under the 
memor~ndum each authority must inspect a minimum of 25% of the 
ships using its ports. Guidelines for inspection are set out in 
Annex 1. Where an inspection reveals deficiencies what are 
clearly hazardous to safety, heal th or the environment, the 
hazard must be removed before the ship is allowed to proceed to 
sea. 
Art 94(6) of LOSC (1982) provides that a state which has clear 
grounds for believing that a flag state has not exercised proper 
jurisdiction and control over one of its ships may report the 
facts to the flag state, and that "upon receiving such a report, 
the flag state shall investigate the matter and, if appropriate, 
take action nec~ssary to remedy the situation". 
It is submitted that ships seeking refuge because t:hey have 
sustained damage will consequently not meet the safety standards 
laid down by the conventions and will therefore find themselves 
detained. "Force maj eure" immunity wi 11 logically not apply 
since, as shown, the port states are now tasked with having to 
maintain standards in conjunction with the flag states. A port 
state which is slow or indifferent to maintaining standards of 
seaworthiness will surely also look rather hypocritical if it 
were to apply strict measures of self defence or self-help when 




What is a Port? 
A very wide range of activities are carried out every day in any 
port in the world. To describe a port of any reasonable size as 
a "world of its own" would, in the writer's experience, be 
realistic. "Under a port authority's administration in a major 
port, are to be found surveyors, repair yards, dry docks, 
maintenance companies, chandlers, stevedore and tallying firms, 
traffic control officials, harbour pol ice, pi lotage services; 
towage services, etc., working in co-operation with one another 
towards the ultimate aim of providing an efficient, safe and 
valuable service to ships of all types and sizes using the port 
facilities". (Hill; op cit 390). 
In the case of R v HANNAM (1886; 2 TLR; @ 234) Lord Esher said 
"a harbour in its ordinary sense was a place to shelter ships 
from the violence of the sea, and where ships were brought to 
load and unload goods". In HUNTER v NORTHERN MARINE INSURANCE 
COMPANY (1888; 13 App Cas 717) Lord Hers~hel said "A port is a 
place where a vessel can lie in a position of more or less 
shelter from the elements, with a view to the loading or 
discharge of cargo". At common law, therefore, "harbour" and 
"port" seem to be synonymous for most purposes. 
A question which occasionally arises in relation to the 
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definition of "harbour" is whether a particular area of water is 
sufficiently enclosed or sheltered by land to be regarded as a 
harbour. The United Kingdom Harbour Act of 1964 defines harbour 
in sec 57(1) as "ariy harbour, whether nat~ral or artificial, and 
any port, haven, estuary, tidal or other river or inland waterway 
navigated by sea-going ships" . 
. "Statutory powers are neC;essary to manage a harbour as the 
construction and maintenance or harbour works below high water 
mark may be open to challenge in the courts, unless such 
construction and maintenance is authorized by statute, on the 
grounds that the works interfere with the public right of 
riavigation, and furthermore, harbour authorities for significant 
harbours need to have powers to regulate ... the movement and 
berthing of ships within the harbour. Adequate powers for these 
purposes can only be obtained by or under statute". (Douglas and 
Geen; The Law of Harbours and Pilotage; 1989; @ 2). 
The Right of Entry 
The sovereignty, of a state, should not be construed as 
conferring upon it unlimited power to p~ohibit the use of its 
ports and harbours to foreign nationals. This would imply a 
neglect of its duties for the promotion of international 
relationships, navigation and trade which customary international 
law imposes upon it. (Colompos; op cit 150) 
Churchill and Lowe (op cit 52) state "the existence of 
sovereignty over internal waters and absence of any general right 
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of innocent passage through them logically implies the absence 
of any right in customary international law for foreign ships to 
enter a state's ports. There is, indeed, very little support in 
state practice for such a right, except for ships in distress 
seeking safety, which enjoy a right of entry". Churchill & Lowe 
however follow up this statement later on by saying "it is 
generally admitted that a state may close even its international 
.ports to protect its vital interests without thereby violating 
customary international law, and it would be difficult to 
establish that any interests invoked by a state were inadequate 
to justify closure. Furthermore, states have a wide right to 
prescribe conditions for access to their ports". 
In several cases it has been indicated that distress constitutes 
sufficient excuse for entering a blockaded port and exempts the 
vessel from the usual penalty attaching thereto (Jessup; op cit 
196). In the case of the DIANA (1868; 7 Wall;@ 354), Field J. 
said "It is undoubtedly true that a vessel may be in such 
distress as to justify her in attempting to enter a 6lockaded 
port. She may be out of provisions or water, or she may be in 
uncontrollable necessity, which admits of no compromise, and 
cannot be resisted, will be held a justification of the offence. 
Any rule less stringent than this would open the door to all 
sorts of fraud." 
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In a later case, the NUESTRA SENORA DE REGLA (1872; 17 Wall; @ 
29) the Supreme court_ held that a vessel which had put into the 
blockaded port of Port Royal.in actual di~tress and want of coal, 
was clearly "not lawful prize of war or subject of capture, and 
the corporation which owned her is doubtless entitled to fair 
indemnity for the losses sustained by the seizure and employment 
of the vessel." 
· Although the above two cases are centred around a "blockaded 
port" it is submitted that the principles of a distressed ship's 
right of entry are the same·whether the port is blockaded or not. 
The general principles applicable to ports, harbours and 
roadsteads are capable of be in·g summarised as fallows: ( Colombos; 
op cit 150) 
a. In time of peace, commercial ports must be left open to 
international traffic. The 1 iberty of access to ports 
granted to foreign vessels implies their right to load and 
unload their cargoes. It is submitted that this ~oint is, 
as shown, · in conflict with LOSC (1982). 
b. No port can ever be shut against a foreign ship seeking 
shelter from tempest or compelled to enter it in distress. 
c. Purely military ports may be closed to all foreign warships 
or merchant vessels 
precaution. 
on the ground of justifiable 
d. Entry of ships of war even into commercial ports may be 
subjected to certain restrictions both as regards the 




e. Each state has the right to enact laws controlling 
navigation within its national waters. 
The above points show that the entry of foreign vessels may 
therefore be reasonably regulated provided international law is 
not unreasonably compromised and no d iscr iminat ion is made 
between states so as to favour some at the expense of others. 
On December 9, 1923, a Convention and Statute relating to the 
"International Re~ime of Maritime Ports" was signed at Geneva, 
providing that the sea-going vessels of the contracting parties 
shall enj-0y on a basis of reciprocity, equality of treatment in, 
and freedom of access to, the maritime ports of contracting 
parties. The United Kingdom together with several other states 
(33) have ratified the Convention (Churchill & Lowe; op cit XXI). 
Port State Legislative and Enforcement Jurisdiction 
In the case of the INDUSTRIA (1869; Forsyth; Cases and Opinions 
on Constitutional Law; @ p399, 400) which put into Jamaica in 
distress, Attorney General Legare maintained "that no authority 
or principle, or analogy of the law of nations, will justify the 
enforcing on board a foreign ship, thus involuntarily within the 
jurisdiction of a foreign nation, the municipal law of that 
nation, to the utter subversion of authorities and rights 
undoubtedly established and guaranteed by the municipal law of 
its own country. The principle is, that if a vessel be driven 
by stress of weather, or forced by "vis major", or, in short, be 




compelled by any overruling necessity to take refuge in the ports 
of another, she is not considered as subject to the municipal law 
of that other, so far as concerns any penalty, prohibition~ tax 
or incapacity that would otherwise be incurred by entering the 
ports; provided that she do nothing further to violate the 
municipal law during her stay." 
International law demands that distressed ships be given a degree -
of immunity from coastal state jurisdiction. They are entitled 
to be excused liabilities which arise inevitably from their entry 
in distress - for eg. liability to pay import duties on their 
cargo or liability to arrest. (Churchill & Lowe; op cit 57). 
Although the above shows that distressed vessels do have a degree 
of immunity, it is submitted that certain enforcement 
j ur isd ict ion must apply to al 1 vessels, regard less of their 
condition in the interests of self-help and the enforcement of 
international pollution and navigation rules. In the more recent 
case of PEARN v SARGENT (1973; 2 AC;@ 141) Lord Widgery said of 
Sec 52 of the United Kingdom Harbours, Docks and Pierfl Clauses 
Act 1847 that "the function of the Harbour Master is to regulate 
traffic; after all it i? a public harbour where the public have 
a right to be, and it is not the Harbour Master's function to 
keep them out. Of course, there will be cases when he has to go 
beyond these simple functions; of course there may be cases where 
necessity arises and he has to impose wider prohibitions for a 
particular time ... " 
Given the highly dange~ous nature of some modern cargoes, and the 
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catastrophe which could result if, say, a ship with defective 
steering collided with a gas carrier, the United Kingdom felt 
that there ought to be a clear power for a Harbour Master to 
prohibit a ship from entering or to require a ship to leave a 
harbour where, in his opinion, this was necessary to avoid a 
serious accident. This was the genesis of the United Kingdom 
Dangerous Vessels Act of 1985 (Douglas & Geen; op cit 42). It 
is submitted that a damaged vessel seeking refuge, which is a 
potential pollution or fire threat, would also be classified as 
a "dangerous vessel". 
14- Sec 1 of the Act enables a Harbour Master to give directions 
prohibiting the entry into, or requiring the removal from, the 
harbour of any vessel if, in his opinion, the condition of that 
vessel, or the nature or condition of anything it contains, is 
such that its presence in the harbour might involve: 
a. grave and imminent danger to the safety of any person or 
property; or 
b. grave and imminent risk that the vessel may, by s~nking or 
foundering in the harbour, prevent or seriously prejudice 
the use of the harbour by other vessels. 
In deciding whether to give directions under Sec~ion 1 in any 
particular case, a Harbour Master must have regard to all the 
circumstances of that case and, in particular, to the safety of 
any person or vessel, whether in or outside the harbour, and 
including the ·vessel which would be the subject of his 
directions. 
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It is submitted that the purpose of the Act is to enable the 
Harbour Master to ta_ke action to avoid a· catastrophic accident. 
It does not give him •carte blanche' to exclude ships from the 
harbour. Douglas and Geen (op cit 143) state "It does not 
entitle a Harbour master to exclude a ship simply because, in his 
view, oil from the ship may pollute the harbour - although, if 
he has reason to believe that a ship which proposes to enter the 
harbour does not comply with the requirements of the United 
Kingdom Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Oil Pollution) 
Regulations 1983, he may, and indeed he must, under Regulation 
33 of those Regulations, report the matter to the Secretary of 
State, who may deny the ship entry to port if he is satisfied 
that it presents an unreasonable threat of harm to the marine 
environment". 
"The universal enforcement jurisdiction of a port state is the 
most important innovation of the enforcement system established 
by the LOSC (1982) with regard to pollution from ships and a 
notable achievement of that Convention from an environmental 
perspective. This is particularly so because, unlike coastal 
state enforcement, the port state's enforcement, while 
strengthening compliance, involves no interference with the 
freedom of navigation, for it applies only to vessels being 
voluntarily in the port of that state" (Kwiatkowska; op cit 180). 
Art 218 empowers the port state to investigate, and where the 
evidence so warrants, institute proceedings with respect of "any 
discharge" from a vessel "outside" that state's jurisdiction, but 
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only for violation of applicable international rules and 
standards. The port state may· also prosecute discharge 
violations committed within maritime zones of the other states, 
but only at the express request of such other state, the flag 
state or a state damaged or threatened by a violation, or when 
a violation is likely or has caused pollution within the maritime 
zones of a port state. (Art 218; para 2). 
when a port state has ascertained that 
More recently here, 
a vessel violated 
international rules and standards relating to seaworthiness of 
vessels (Standards on constructions, design, equipment, operation 
and manning of ships) and thereby threatens damage to the marine 
environment, it is obliged, under Art 219, to take administrative 
measures to prevent the vessel from sailing. Such measures are 
to be taken "as far as practical" and may include permitting th~ 
vessel to proceed to the nearest repair yard. Upon removal of 
.the causes of a violation, the port state must permit the vessel 
to continue immed lately. Art 2 20 ( 1) fol lows customary 
international law, though supplementing it as a result of the 
introduction of the EEZ, by providing that a state may a~rest and 
prosecute a vessel in one of its ports which is alleged to have 
violated that state's pollution laws or applicable international 
rules in its territorial sea or EEZ. 
The LOSC (1982) provisions represent a significant extension of 
the rules of MARPOL 1973/1978, which provide, in Art 4-7, only 
for an inspection by a port state, and merely in relation to 
discharge violations occurring within the national jurisdiction. 
MARPOL (Art 9; para 2) does say however, that the convention is 
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without prejudice to "the codification and development of the law 
of the sea" or to "the present or future claims and legal views 
of any state concerning the law of the sea and the nature and 
extent of coastal and flag state jurisdiction". Para 3 of Art 
9 also stipulates that the term jurisdiction is to be applied in 
the light of international law in force at the time of 
application or interpretation of the MARPOL Convention. 
Economic Considerations 
It is well established that a Harbour Authority will be liable 
if they, or their servants, fail to exercise reasonable care and 
skill in carrying out the Harbour Authority's functions (Douglas 
& Geen; op cit 18). It was held in MERSEY DOCKS AND HARBOUR 
BOARD TRUSTEES v GIBBS (1866; LR 1 HL; @ 93) that Harbour 
Authorities are liable for damage occasioned by their failure to 
take reasonable care that their dock, so far as they keep it open 
for public use, may be used by those who choose to navigate it 
without danger to their lives or property. In the case QUEEN OF 
THE RIVER STEAMSHIP CO v RIVER THAMES CONSERVATORS (1906"; 96 LT) 
it was held however that a Harbour Authority is not liable for 
damage caused by an obstruction in their harbour which they are 
not aware of and could n~t reasonably be expected to be aware of. 
In a charterparty contract the preliminary voyage will usually 
be to a port specified in the contract. The charterparty may 
give the charterer the option to name a port, or to proceed to 
a "port or ports as ordered ••• and it will·-be appreciated that 
such an option must be exercised within a reasonable time, for 
I 
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if the vessel is kept waiting, heavy overhead charges are 
incurred." (Chorely & Giles; op cit 220) 
Scrutton on Charterparties (1984; 19ed;@ 125) states that where 
the charterer does not expressly undertake to nominate a safe 
port, there is an implied obligation to do so. In the case of 
LEEDS SHIPPING CO LTD v SOCIETE FRANCAISE BUNGE (1958; 2 Lloyds 
Rep; 127@ 131) Sellers LJ defined a "safe port" as "a port that 
will not be safe unless, in the relevant period of time, the 
particular ship can reach it, use it and return from it without, 
in the absence of some abnormal occurrence, being exposed to 
danger which cannot be avoided by good navigation and 
seamanship". 
Hill (op cit 394) states that "if the owner of the harbour 
property is a private owner, he is liable to shipowners in the 
same way as an occupier of premises on land. The harbour-owner 
must make the premises as safe as care and skill can reasonably 
make them. This principle is based on the commercial 
consideration that this is his fundamental duty if he has agreed 
that for financial consideration persons have the right to enter 
upon the property for a purpose which both parties mutually 
contemplate". In the case of BULK OIL SS CO LTD v TEES 
CONSERVANCY COMMISSIONERS (1948; 81 Ll L Rep; @ 479) the court 
said that the obligation is not an abstract warranty. It is an 
obligation to use reasonable care to see that the port is 
rea·sonably safe_ for those coming there and navigating it on 
lawful occasions and for reward to the authority. Liability 
--- - ·--------· ----·- ----, --- - . - ···---------•-·---· - ·----- - . - ---- -. . 
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depends on the special individual relationship arising with each 
ship entering the authority's jqrisdiction and is a duty to be 
considered analogous to the ordinary common law dut;y existing as 
between i~vitor and invitee. 
The above discussion. shows that a safe available port is 
essential for the smooth operation of commercial shipping and 
that a Port Authority has an obligation to ensure that the port 
meets the reasonable expectations of the shipping operators. 
Clogging a port with "force majeure" vessels, especially those 
which have become distressed due to negligence can obviously 
become a headache for a Port Authority. At the time of writing 
the SAN MARCO (mentioned earlier) has recently occupied two 
hundred and fifty metres of quay space in Cape Town for three 
months and it seems that she will now have to be sold which means 
that she should be in port for at least another month. According 
to the PORTNET tariff book of 1993, for a ship of the size of the 
SAN MARCO, there is an initial charge of about $5000.00 for a 
docking. Substantial revenue can therefore be lost wtten there 
is a poor turnover of shipping due to congestion. It is 
submitted that a port will not be able to turn away a distressed 
vessel for commercial reasons but the Port will be fully entitled 
to control and manage her so that she causes as little disruption 
as possible. 
. . -. . ' 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONFLICT OF INTERESTS 
The Salvor 
The right of refuge of the distressed ship and the rights and 
international obligations of the state can, it is submitted, be 
a source of conflict. Salvers are also frequently involved in 
distress cases and their objectives are to deliver a distressed 
vessel to safe waters as "the ultimate outcome must be successful 
in some degree before a reward can be paid, ... as salvage is 
based on the simple idea that a reward is paid out of the fund 
preserved as a result of the property having been saved" (Hill; 
op cit 195). Lord Phillimore said in the case of SS MELANIE v 
SS SAN ONOFRE (1925; AC; @ 246-262) that "success is necessary 
for a salvage award. Contributions to that success, or as it is 
sometimes expressed, meritorious contributions to that success, 
give a title to a salvage award. Services, however meritorious, 
which do not contribute to the ultimate success, do ngt give a 
title to salvage reward. Sezvices which rescue a vessel from one 
danger but end up leaving her in a position of as great or nearly 
as great a danger, though of another kind, are · held not to 
contribute to the ultimate success and do not entitle to salvage 
reward". 
The principle of "no cure - no pay" in salvage can also, it is 
submitted, be a source of conflict between the salvers and the 
coastal state. Salvage principles mean that salvers have to be 
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positive and confident in their work and an over-cautious coastal 
state which is taking its pollution and self help-rights to the 
limit is naturally not going to be received very well by salvers 
trying to deliver their "prize" to safe waters. Local salvers 
are, however, surely an asset to a state as they proyide the 
expertise t9 protect a coastline by being able to tow potentially 
hazardous vessels to safety or, if the situation warrants it, 
removing them to a safe distance. 
The MIMOSA Incident 
A coastal state and local salvage companies would logically 
benefit from mutual respect and co-operation. 
A good example of this was the damaged MIMOSA. The 357 000 dwt 
Norwegian tanker was about 20NM south of Cape Recife in August 
1991. Due to weather damage (August 1991), hydraulic lines to 
her steering gear brakes fractured, leaked oil and caused her 
rudder to thrash about and finally to lock into a "hard-a-
starboard" position. 
Local salvers, Pentow Marine, were called and a Lloyds Open Form 
was signed. The Pentow Marine salvage tugs WOLRAAD WOLTEMADE and 
JOHN ROSS sailed from Cape Town. Despite the extreme conditions, 
the tugs made good time in winds in excess of 100 knots and 23m 
swells (weather recorded by the Mossgas production platform). 
A tow was secured when the MIMOSA was only about 12 NM from the 
"Riy · Bank" and dr i £ting fast. Shortly before the tow was 
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connected the ship started to break up. A 230m 2 hole appeared 
in the starboard side, fortunately in way of an empty ballast 
tank, and cracks developed on the port side. 
With a salvage tug at each end, the tanker was taken about 35 NM 
out to sea and held into the weather while a "Kuswag" pollution 
vessel, also owned by the salvers, dealt with the oil spillage 
which was estimated to be only a few hundred barrels and not 
significant. 
When the situation had been assessed and permission obtained from 
the Department of Transport, the ship was taken into Algoa Bay 
with a draft of 22,5m. It was then decided to perform a ship-to-
ship transfer of the cargo of oil. Fortuitously, a sister ship 
of the MIMOSA, the HANSA VEGA, was nearby and was diverted to 
Algoa Bay. 
Meanwhile, Pentow Marine prepared for the ship-to-ship transfer. 
Whilst the two big salvage tugs stood by, the CAUSEWAY SALVOR 
(another vessel in Pentow Marine's fleet) was dispatched from 
Cape Town with the necessary transfer equipment, the PENTOW 
MALGAS from Mossel Bay and two Pentow Marine Kuswag pollution 
vessels. The salvage team, which included ten divers, were flown 
from Cape Town. Six giant fenders were rigged on the port side 
of the MIMOSA in preparation _for the two 362m ships to be 
alongside each other. The WOLRAAD WOLTEMADE was secured to the 
stern of the ships to keep them bow to sea and swell. 
60 
Pumping began at a rate of 9000 tons per hour and increased to 
11 000 tons per hour. Four days later the job was completed. 
In the meantime efforts had been made to bring the rudder into 
the amidships position. When this failed, the problem was 
eventually solved by the JOHN ROSS putting "up a wire" and 
heaving the rudder into po~ition. When the job was ~ompleted, 
the HANSA VEGA sailed for Rotterdam with the cargo, and the 
WOLRAAD WOLTEMADE with the MIMOSA in tow, for Dubai. (Details 
supplied by SA Shipping News and Fishing Industry Review; 1991; 
Vol 46; No.4). 
It is submitted that the above incident is almost a textbook case 
of co-operation between parties and professionalism on the part 
of the salvers and ships' crews. Such was the success of the 
sal vor 's work that they received, it was thought by Pent ow 
Marine, to be a world record salvage award. The right of refuge 
principle was al~o perfectly observed. The advantage of having 
salvers with local knowledge is also evident and there was no 
controversy with the authorities. 
One could argue however, that the permission that was obtained 
from the DOT to enter Algoa Bay and the fact that she was 
l 
initially ordered to go 35NM offshore, was a contravention of the 
ship's right of innocent passage. Algoa Bay is not a closed or 
historical bay and the waters are therefore territorial and not 
internal. (Art 3; LOSC). The MIMOSA's oil leak was, as stated, 
not significant and the only way that the DOT could justify their 
control over her movements in international law was if she was 
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reasonably perceived to be a serious threat to the environment. 
(See "Distressed Ship and Maritime Zones (Territorial Seas); @ 
Chap 3 above). 
Unfortunately, as will be seen shortly, events do not always 
proceed as they did in the MIMOSA incident, but it is hoped that 
the course of events surrounding her distress and subsequent 
• 
entry into sheltered waters can serve as a reminder of what can 
be achieved, even in very difficult and hazardous conditions. 
The RIVER PLATE Incident 
The relationship between the salver, the state and the 
master/owner of the distressed ship surrounding the principle of 
"right of refuge" can be well illustrated by the damaged 131,260 
ton (deadweight) bulk carrier, RIVER PLATE. The vessel was en 
route from Montevideo to the Far East when, on the 21st July 
1993, she reported through a Lloyds Intelligence report that she 
had a hole in the port side and was taking water. The captain 
of the vessel was concerned about the structural integriJy of the 
ship (she was fully laden with iron ore) and requested helicopter 
service to remove the non essential crew members and asked the 
South African authorities for permission to enter False Bay so i 
that she could undertake repairs. (Details supplied by Mr _G 
Needham; Pentow Marine). 
"False Bay" lies to the west of Cape Point. It is some 30km wide 
between _its natural entrance points, Cape Point and Cape 
Hangklip, and. covers an area of 900km2 • It lies some 25km south 
62 
of central Cape Town, with all its attendant facilities. False 
Bay is a haven for shipping, particularly in winter, as it offers 
shelter from the north-west wind which prevails at that time of 
the year". (Devine; op cit 31) 
The waters of False Bay are internal waters as the bay fits the 
definition of a bay found in Art 10 of LOSC (1982). Although the 
bay has not been "closed off" by a closing line, this gap could 
be filled by the courts applying international customary law 
which has been held "to be part of the common law of South 
Africa". (NDULI · v MINISTER OF JUSTICE; 1978; 1 SA 893 (A)). 
International law states that "bays have a close c6nnection with 
land and that it is more appropriate that they should be 
considered as internal waters rather than territorial sea". 
(Churchill & Lowe; op cit 33) In the NDULI judgement, Rumpf£ CJ 
stated that "according to our law only such rules of customary 
international law are to be regarded as part of our law as are 
•either universally recognised or have received the assent of this 
country (SA)". 
Prior to the RIVER PLATE affair, False Bay recently had three 
tankers seeking refuge. These were THE ARABIAN SEA (315,695dwt) 
and THE STAVROS G.L.(350,000 dwt) which both got into 
difficulties in July 1989, and THE ALBOREZ which sought refuge 
with a damaged bow in April 1991. All three tankers were 
sufficiently repaired (see South African Shippirig News, October 
1989 and The Argus 18 April 1991), and in the case of THE 
ALBOREZ, a major ship-to-ship oil transfer was completed without 
,,-. -------~---------· - ---· 
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incident. The ALBOREZ case will be discussed shortly. 
Although the entry into False Bay of the above three ships had 
gone smoothly, the incidents did raise· "an outcry from people 
living near the coast in question: they wished the ships to be 
removed from the bay, no doubt having in mind the potential 
pollution threat represented by the presence of oil tankers, 
particularly leaking ones". (Devine; op cit 82) The Navy 
initially refused THE STAVROS G L entry into the bay and THE 
ALBOREZ was described as a "pollution time bomb" (Devine; op cit 
82). The Argus (18 April 1991) quoted Mr Jannie Momberg MP as 
saying that he wanted "to reiterate (his) strongest objections 
against bringing tankers into False Bay". 
It was against this background that the South African Department 
of Transport (DOT) had to decide a course of action for the 
distressed RI VER PLATE. The Principal Officer for the Marine 
division of the DOT advised the vessel that the State would first 
have to inspect the vessel and that she would have to be~escorted 
to False Bay by a sufficiently strong tug. Pentow Marine who 
were monitoring the situation from the beginning, offered the 
vessel a Lloyds Open Form as the master began to fear that the 
ship might sink. The owners rejected the offer outright, and 
when Pentow Marine pointed out that the master was evacuating 
crew members, the owners said "that the master was mad" and that 
they had no faith in him. A deal was however struck on a daily 
hire rate and THE RIVER PLATE was accordingly escorted into False 
Bay. (Details supplied by Pentow Marine). 
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Once she was safely anchored, the owners of THE RIVER PLATE then 
attempted to dismiss the tug claiming that thse danger was over 
and that the attendance of a salvage tug was totally unnecessary. 
The DOT reacted swiftly by threatening to expel the vessel if she 
dismissed the tug as their Port State inspection had found that 
the Master's damage report was grossly inaccurate~ The State 
Surveyor reported that "the port side hull plating amidships in 
holds three and five was found adrift from the frames and 
panting" (Seatrade Week Newsfront (SWN) 30 July-3 August 1993, 
Vol XII No 31). To complicate the matter further, a repair team 
was found on board the vessel having sailed with the ship from 
Brazil, whose job it was to conduct repairs on the voyage. Local 
inspectors told SWN that "the ship had numerous prefabricated web 
frames already on board along with a 14-man "riding squad". 
Moreover sea scaffolding had been erected in several holds and 
large sections of frame had been replaced in other parts of the 
hull. Whether or not work was being done during the laden 
voyage, the operator was clearly aware that the structure of the 
vessel had deteriorated (SWN; No 31). 
Mr Simon Cooper of Fairbridge, ~rderne & Lawton Inc., who was 
appointed to represent the owners in an· interview with the 
writer, ( 13 Jan 94), defended the owners' decision to dismiss the 
tug as he felt that the South African authorities over-reacted 
on their insistence. of having a tug on standby and that the 
Government's attitude to distressed ships (particularly those 
entering False Bay) is "with all due respect, dogmatic and 
without due regard to all the facts". The Principal Officer of 
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the DOT (Cape Town), when asked about the "status quo" of False 
Bay said that "it is now a standa.rd rule that any distressed ship 
that is given permission to enter False Bay will be obliged to 
take a tug". (Interview with the Principal Officer of Cape Town 
13 Jan. 19 9 4) . 
The refusal of THE RIVER PLATE'S owners to hire a standby tug 
caused further problems for the DOT. The Principal Officer 
stated that "we are caught between the devil and the deep blue 
sea" (SWN; No 31) and that THE RIVER PLATE was "in breach of the 
agreement (to take a standby tug) and laid down conditions 
so I had no alternative other than to kick the ship out of the 
bay". (Cape Times, July 29 1993). 
The attitude of the DOT to a distressed vessel is clearly 
influenced by the circumst.ances surrounding the case. The 
Principal Officer (Cape Town) admitted that the fact that the 
ship misled him through its damage report, the owner's sudden 
refusal to hire a tug and that she only had a tired skel~ton crew 
on board, had caused him to take "no chances" and he gave the 
ship the ultimatum of complying with his conditions or leaving 
False Bay. 
THE RIVER PLATE, it is submitted, was not seaworthy to do her 
contemplated voyage and it seems very unfair that the State 
should be pressurised by her owners. On the other hand, whatever 
the circumstances, a state cannot, as mentioned earlier, take 
advantage of a distressed ship. Pentow Marine's "daily hire" 
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rate for providing a standby tug was deemed far too high by the 
owners (Cape Times; 29 July 1993) and after lengthy negotiations 
Pentow Marine reduced their price by 40%. 
Pent ow Marine' s tug stood by THE RIVER PLATE for three days 
before she was finally allowed to be dismissed by the DOT. 
Allegations were made that the early dismissal was to encourage 
the vessel to do extensive repairs in South African waters and 
hence provide a considerable contract to local repair contractors 
but this was denied by the DOT who stated that "after the third 
day the vessel had stabilised and the repairs were well under way 
so there was no further need to have a tug on standby". 
The SAN MARCO Incident 
The Principal Officer, who let it be known in no uncertain terms, 
that the crews and owners of many vessels sailing the oceans 
these days could "simply not be trusted" and he owed it to the 
State to take precautions, to cover any eventuality- The 
attitude of mistrust is supported by an incident like the already 
mentioned SAN MARCO detained in Cape Town harbour (November 
1993). The vessel was in Vancouver a few months earlier to load 
a sulphur cargo and was also detained on 22 May 1993 for 
unseaworthiness. Towards the end of June she was allowed to 
depart Vancouver under tow as "so bad was the condition of the 
ship that the Canadian Coast Guard would only allow her to be 
towed unmanned" to a repair_yard (Seatrade Review; June 1993). 
On 20 July 1993, however, she was reported by Lloyds Register to 
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be passing Panama. 
What happened to the repairs? The presumption must be that the 
ship, notwithstanding that she was in such a dangerous condition 
that she had to be towed unmanned, picked up its crew again in 
Mexico and sailed to Brazil to pick up another cargo 
substantially in the same state as she had been in Vancouver 
(Seatrade; op cit 8). 
How could Hellenic Register (which surveyed the ship in May 1993) 
have found the ship to be in a "good condition and well 
maintained" the same month as she was detained by the Canadian 
Coast Guard for unseaworthiness? ( Survey details supplied by 
Sea trade; op cit 8) . · These guest ions were put by Seatrade to 
Hellenic Registry but after three weeks the magazine was still 
unable to obtain an answer. 
Sometimes it is even difficult to trace the owners as was the 
case with the SAN MARCO. In Seatrade it was stated-that "to 
anyone outside the shipping industry it would seem astonishing 
that it could prove difficult, as it does in this kind of set up, 
to trace the real owner of 57,000 dwt of potentially lethal 
transport vehicle. Within the shipping industry it is accepted 
with a shrug". (op cit 7). 
The ALBOREZ Incident 
In April 1991 the ALBOREZ, an Iranian tanker with a seriously 
damaged bow, anchored at Roman Rock Lighthouse in False Bay. The 
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ALBOREZ was refused permission to anchor in Table Bay because of 
rough weather and the danger of oil pollution. She was suspected 
of not being insured against oil spillage (as required by the 
Prevention and Combatting of Pollution of the Sea by Oil Act 6 
of 1981; Sec 13) and was ordered to a distance of 50 NM from the 
coast by the DOT. When it was discovered that she was insured, 
she was given permission·to enter the calmer waters of False Bay 
to be inspected. A ship-to-ship trans£ er of oi 1 to another 
tanker, the HAPPY FIGHTER, was completed to avoid any possible 
pollution. (Details supplied by The Argus; 18 April 1991). The 
ALBOREZ was not breaking up or sinking and "no oil spillage was 
taking place but it could not be denied that an element of risk 
occurred in the oil transfer. If the tanker had been on the open 
sea, transfer· could have resulted in further damage to and 
tearing of the hull and the resultant pollution would have been 
greater in any pumping operation". (Devine; op cit 88). 
The quest ion that can now be asked is whether the DOT acted 
against customary law by sending the distressed ship a~ay from 
the coast on a wrong presumption that she had no oil pollution 
certificate and, as it was later discovered, she was not breaking 
up or leaking oil. The DOT pointed out that "anything with oil 
is a danger". To justify their decision to admit, finally, the 
ALBOREZ to internal waters they said that there "is less of a 
danger than sending the tanker away to sink somewhere and cause 
a huge disaster". (Cape Times; 19 April 1991). 
Devine is of the view that although the ship was in no danger of 
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sinking, it was reasonable to think that immediate repairs were 
essential before the ALBOREZ was sent back to sea "lest her 
sinking resulted, not only in the loss of the ship herself, but 
also in major environmental damage. False Bay was probably the 
best place to effect an inspection of the damage and an oil 
transfer before repairs could be carried out." (op cit 88). 
It is subml.tted that the response from the DOT on the whole was 
a proportionate response to what seemed to be at that stage a 
minor threat to the environment. One point of concern however, 
is the "assumption" that there was no insurance and that the 
tanker was in danger of sinking. Both assumptions turned out to 
be inaccurate and had the ALBOREZ sustained further and 
unnecessary damage by being sent 50 NM offshore in stormy seas, 
a serious situation for the state would have occurred. The 
transfer of oil in False Bay (which appeared to be a necessary 
procedure in this casualty) went off smoothly and without 
incident and the order initially to the ship to distance herself 
by at least 50 NM from the coast could be interpreted as being 
in contravention of the rights of a ship in distress. It would 
also contravene Art 58 of LOSC (1982) which states that "In the 
EEZ, all states ... enjoy ... the freedom referred to in Art 87 
of navigation ... and other internationally lawful uses of the 
sea, such as those associated with the operation of ships". 
The ALBOREZ's insurance should also not have been a factor as a 
distressed ship's right of refuge is a basic right and is not 
qualified in customary law over issues such as insurance, nor is 
freedom of navigation restricted by insurance conditions. 
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The ATLAS PRIDE Incident 
Another victim of winter gales off the South African coast was 
the fully-laden, 248· 000 dwt Greek tanker ATLAS PRIDE, in heavy 
seas off East London. Plating was ripped from her port bow and 
she trailed a six-mile oil slick until oil was pumped into a 
reserve tank. 
Inspectors viewed the damaged ship from an aircraft and reported 
that a gale force southwester and Sm waves were not breaking up 
' . 
the slick. "Kuswag" anti-pollution vessels were dispatched from 
Durban and East London. 
The salvage tug JOHN ROSS was early on the scene but Greek owners 
Phoenix Maritime declined. assistance offered by Pentow MariDe. 
Instead they negotiated with a Greek salvage firm, accepted a tow 
from an oil rig supply craft, the HERDENTOR, and under the orders 
of the DOT attempted to tow the vessel 50 NM offshore in a 
southerly direction until a relief tanker could be found. 
The next day, to the surprise of the DOT, the ATLAS PRIDE was 
only 19 NM from the coast. The HERDENTOR was clearly not 
managing the tow. Later the owners did a re-think and Pentow 
Marine were appointed as sub-contractors. The DOT then insisted 
that the ATLAS PRIDE owners produce a comprehensive salvage plan 
as at that stage the Greek salvage company had "provided one 
salvage Master and nine cans of dispersant". 
Four days later, . with her bow visibly working, the tanker was 
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struck by more heavy weather while standing by about 50 NM 
offshore. Winds gusted up to 80 knots. Pentow Marine divers had 
boarded the ship and sprayed detergent into the damaged 
compartment to disperse the oil left there. 
Two tankers in the area would have provided suitable ship-to-ship 
transfer but the owners insisted on the ALSOMA AL ARABIA, which 
they were operating, being diverted on passage from South 
America. 
Under the direction of Pentow Marine's Captain Dai Davies, the 
two big ships were eventually moored alongside one another. 
Pumping took five days at an average 8 500 tons per hour and 
after the transfer the ATLAS PRIDE was towed stern first to Cape 
Town by the JOHN ROSS. (Details from SA Shipping News 1991; Vol 
46 No. 4; and Pentow Marine). 
The controversy surrounding the ATLAS PRIDE incident was that she 
was only sent 50 NM offshore when her owners insisted that the 
oil be transferred into a tanker selected by themselves. Mr 
Simon Cooper said in his interview that "it appeared that the DOT 
were punishing the ATLAS PRIDE for not taking the first available 
ta.nker". 
An important point here is whether the ATLAS PRIDE was in danger 
of causing substantial pollution in the area where she was first 
damaged. As discussed in the MIMOSA incident, the DOT would be 
in contravention of international customary law if it could be 
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proven that the ATLAS PRIDE was not a pollution thre~t as they 
would have tampered with her right of innocent passage. Moreover 
Algoa Bay is in the territorial seas zone and refusing her entry 
into Algoa Bay would therefore also have been illegal. (Art 19; 
LOSC). It is submitted that there can be no "blanket rule" for 
the treatment of damaged tankers in coastal waters. 
Any sort of discriminatory treatment is also clearly not in the 
spirit of a distressed ship's "right of refuge". The owners of 
the ATLAS PRIDE, according to Mr Cooper, had a valid and 
reasonable reason for wanting the transfer of the cargo to be 
rciade with the ALSOMA AL ARABIA. There was no reason why the 
ATLAS PRIDE should not have been allowed to come into Algoa Bay 
to wait there for the arrival of the AL SOMA. AL ARABIA with an 
extra tug in attendance if necessary. As it turned out, the 
ATLAS PRIDE had to spend 4 days out at sea in the teeth of a 
horrific storm. The Master of a bulk carrier, LYDIA which was 
also. in the area at the time and had to seek refuge in Port 
Elizabeth, said that he had "never experienced such_appalling 
conditions in 28 years at sea". 
Mr G Needham of Pentow Marine totally disagrees with Mr Cooper. 
He alleged that the original salvers were incompetent and the 
DOT's decision to send the vessel 50 NM offshore was completely 
justified. He is also of the opinion that Pentow Marine should 
have been awarded co-salver and not merely subcontractor status. 
On this issue the question could be asked why the South African 
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government did not exercise their right to appoint Pentow Marine 
as sal vars once it became clear that the HERDENTOR was not 
coping. It is submitted that this question would, in terms of 
International Law, only have been relevant if the ATLAS PRIDE was 
a danger to the state. The HERDENTOR's ability to tow the vessel 
would have to, until then, remain an issue between the ship and 
the salvor. 
The 1981 Oil Pollution Act states in Art 4(2)(a) that "If in the 
opinion of the Minister, the master and owner of ... a tanker are 
or would be incapable of complying with a requirement made 
under Sec 1 (Powers of the Minister to take steps to prevent 
pollution of the sea where oil is being, Q!:.. is likely to be 
discharged) ... the Minister may cause any such steps to be taken 
as he has power to require to be taken in terms of the said 
subsection." This decision, should it have been taken, would 
not have affected the salvers remuneration as they are protected 
under Sec 23 of the same Act which states" ... no provision of 
this Act shall be construed as derogating from any ... right of 
salvage award, ~or shall a salvor who would be entitled to a 
salvage award in respect of an act of salvage actually performed, 
cease to be so entitled merely on the ground that such act was 
carried out as a direct or indirect result of a requirement laid 
down or an order issued in terms of this act." 
The exercise of the above powers would surely also have to be 
judged from the point of view of international law. For th~ 
Ministe·r to exercise powers that infringe on ships' rights when 
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this is not necessary to avoid danger, would be contrary to 
international law and flag states could protest. 
Fortunately for all concerned, the transfer was, as mentioned, 
finally completed without incident, but the question could be 
asked why the whole affair could not have been handled in a 
smoother, less abrasive manner? 
In sympathy with the DOT one should remember that "The risk of 
a major oil disaster is also serious because of the potential 
consequences. The seas around South Africa are highly productive 
and support large scale commercial fishing. These substantial 
resources are continually at risk. In addition, the mild climate 
has permitted recreational facilities to be highly developed 
along the coast. These too are at risk." (DJ Devine; 1986; The 
Law of the Sea; Art: Sea Passage in South African Maritime Zones: 
Actualities and Possibilities: @ 215). 
The DOT has the unenviable duty to make the correct~ decision 
concerning distressed ships in the light of the fact that 
distancing damaged tankers from the coast is prima facie 
inierference with passage rights and navigation and it would have 
to be achieved in conformity with international law, and 
particularly, in accordance with the provisions of Art 196 of 
LOSC (see The Distressed Ship and Maritime Zones; High Seas; @ 
Chap 3 above). It is submitted that the DOT must base its 
actions on "intervention" which is ex post facto and occurs only 
where there has been a maritime casualty. 
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The Press 
Two final points on the subject of "conflict of interests" are 
the emotions of the public· and the sometimes very inaccurate 
reporting in the media. Mr Needham of Pentow Marine said a 
description of a vessel in False Bay being labelled as a 
"floating time bomb" (Argus; 18 April 1991) shows a "great level 
of ignorance". The False Bay situation reached such a stage of 
conflict that a meeting was called by Mr A Clayton (Cape Town 
City Engineer) to discuss the issue with all interested parties. 
Mr Needham was invited to put the salver's case and he 
successfully allayed many of their fears. (Interview with Mr 
Needham 12 Jan 1994). 
Pacifying the public however, is a different matter. The 
Principal Officer of Cape Town said that public awareness 
regarding oil pollution influenced him greatly in his decisions 
concerning distressed ships. It is submitted, in his defence, 
that should an oil spill occur as a direct result of the DOT 
giving refuge to a distressed ship, the Principal Offieer would 
receive a cool reception if he tried to justify his actions 
against the international principle of distressed ships having 
a right of refuge. 
In the THE RIVER PLATE incident, the Cape Times (28 July 1993) 
began reporting on the matter under the headline "Crew lifted off 
damaged tanker". The article also carried a quote from Major 
Redelinghuys (SA Air Force) who said that the airlift was a 
"precautionary measure" and not a distress signal. As stated 
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earlier THE RIVER PLATE was a bulkcarrier and it is not 
surprising that the public could become confused and pressurise 
the DOT when they read that a "tanker" was limping into False Bay 




Many of the leading cases on distressed ships and their entry 
into places of -refuge date back approximately to the turn of the 
century, and whilst it would surely be dangerous and undesirable 
for the crew and owners if the status of a distressed ship should 
change, it is suggested that modern vessels provide a far greater 
threat to the coastal state than the vessels of yesteryear. 
States therefore have the difficult task of applying a customary 
law that was initially reasonable to enforce but is now becoming 
more and more controversial with the added complication of the 
need for expensive salvage tugs which can sometimes be 
interpreted as exploiting the distressed ship. 
Worldwide awareness of oil pollution, new conventions coupled 
with some horrific tanker disasters (including disasters which 
could have been avoided such as THE AMOCO CADIZ), have caused the 
"starting point" of the discussion of the distressed ship to move 
away from her "right of refuge" to considerations why she should 
not come near the coast. The comments on the "status quo" of 
False Bay by the Principal Officer of Cape Town is a clear 
example· of this as it disregards the principle of "right of 
refug~" or the principle that action by means of self-defence or 
self-help must be proportional to the threat. 
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It is a simple fact that ships do have accidents and will suffer 
weather damage even if they are on a maiden voyage and a place 
of refuge is in many cases the first line of defence for the 
saving of a ship and her crew. In a mariner's chronicle it was 
written in 1834 that "never do the mere unassisted efforts of man 
appear feebler than amid those great convulsions of nature to 
which the mariner is so especially exposed". 
The function of sea transport like that of any other form of 
transport, is to move things. It's success lies in finding 
people who have things to move and in it's ability to move them 
safely and efficiently. Distressed ships are an unfortunate 
spinoff of this trade, which must surely be the oldest form of 
transport, and it is essential that coastal state governments 
keep a cool head and deal with the principle of "the right of 
refuge" in a sensible and objective way. 
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